On February 5, an unauthorized person twice gained access to the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system of a water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida. During the second breach, the amount of sodium hydroxide (lye), a caustic and potentially hazardous chemical used as part of the treatment process, was increased to a dangerous level. Fortunately, an operator noticed the actions and was able to quickly correct the situation before water quality or safety were impacted.
Since the incident, several issues have come to light on how someone could have gained access to the system. First, the computers in use were running the 32-bit version of Microsoft Windows 7, an operating system which had reached end of support more than a year prior to the incident.
Second, the compromised computer was running TeamViewer, which allows remote access. TeamViewer had remained installed and was set to allow remote access through an internet connection with a shared password for all users after the organization moved to another remote access solution roughly six months earlier.
Incidents like this are always a good reminder to revisit cybersecurity best practices and limit potential gaps in your systems. A few steps utilities can take to secure their systems include:
These are good initial steps to take, but combating cyber threats fully requires a culture of security awareness and sensitivity throughout the utility. The best cybersecurity programs are founded on the understanding that everyone in the organization must work together to address threats.
System operators often work long shifts in what can become a stressful environment if an incident or malfunction were to occur. Because of this, a great deal of thought typically goes into developing a well-designed, intuitive, and reasonably failsafe user interface. For example, limit checking is typically implemented so that an operator cannot accidentally put the system into an unsafe or unstable condition. In the Oldsmar incident, the amount of lye was able to be changed from 100 parts per million (ppm) to a dangerously high 11,100 ppm.
Beyond the SCADA system, there are often interlocks and monitoring devices that require manual intervention when something strays outside normal operating parameters. For example, if a pump could be damaged with either the upstream or downstream valve closing, relays might inhibit operation of the pump under those conditions. While a sensor could fail or there may be a need to operate a system in an unusual configuration, entering these configurations by accident or without a system of checks and balances is something well-designed systems should avoid (e.g., requiring manual operation of a local override switch that is separate from SCADA control).
What happened in Oldsmar was a cybersecurity event, but utilities can protect customer health and safety by refreshing and reviewing their layers of protection and implementing lessons learned from this incident. Processes and systems for daily operations should have protections to prevent a single act (intentionally or not) from cascading into a much more serious situation.
Addressing the challenges that come with an incident like this requires a different, flexible, and holistic approach to ensure operational resilience. The ability to prevent, respond to, recover, and learn from operational disruptions will safeguard key business services against severe, but plausible threats.
I am even more accessible than the other modals.